In the past few years, the medical case report has been studied as a document that evidences the way the patient and, by extension, the experiential and subjective aspects of an illness tend to be marginalized in contemporary medical theory and practice. First-person narratives about illness, our popular "pathographies," may in part represent our attempt as a culture to respond to this problem of "the vanishing patient." A rich source of information about patient experience, pathographies can be useful to us in locating specific issues in the medical enterprise that need understanding and perhaps require correction. Gilda Radner's It's Always Something demonstrates how two important issues-both neglected in the conventional medical history-powerfully affect the medical enterprise: the hopes, expectations, and wishes of the experiencing patient, and the perceived attitudes and demeanor of the patient's physicians. The restoration of patient and physician to the "history" is important not only because it reminds us of the personal dimension of the medical enterprise, but also because it alerts us to problems of attitude and action that bear directly on diagnosis, course of treatment, and the therapeutic transaction.
illness written by patients or a patient's friend or relative, may represent our response as a culture to this problem of the vanishing patient. Unlike their medical counterparts, these lay writings privilege the phenomenological, the subjective, the experiential side of illness. Pathography restores the patient to the medical enterprise, and it places that person, not disease and treatment, at the very center [13] .
It is important that we bear in mind the fictive quality of both pathography and case history-the fact that the pathographical rendering of an illness experience is not the "real" story any more than is the case history or medical record. As critics and theorists of autobiography and biography have shown us, all forms of life-writing inevitably alter experience in that their authors are selective in what they record, find an order in the incidents and events selected, and impose meaning on the material so ordered. This transformation is certainly true of the case history, which Kathryn Hunter has discussed (in its oral form) as a narrative exercise in interpretation and thus subject to the literary critic's analysis: ".... case histories are themselves readings and interpretations of events as they have been represented in patients' narratives or as they have left their marks on patients' bodies" [14:p. 8] . The medical case history or case presentation is a highly formalized interpretation of the patient's story, but it does not follow that the patient's written narrative is the "true" version of the experience. Pathography must be appreciated not as a genre providing an accurate record of an experience but as an interpretation, a construction, that can give us important information about the subjective dimension of an illness [13] .
In several ways pathography can be viewed as a complement to the medical history. Though both genres concern the sickness and treatment of a specific individual, they are radically different in subject, purpose, structure, authorial persona, and tone. The subject of the case report is a particular biomedical condition, but the subject of pathography is illness and treatment as endured and understood by the ill person who is the author. The purpose of the case report is to record diagnosis and treatment, whereas the purpose of pathography is to draw out the meaning of the author's experience. The medical report is usually composed of brief factual statements about symptoms and body chemistry, but a pathography is an extended narrative situating the illness experience within the author's life and the meaning of that life. The ideal medical report disavows any authorship at all (the first-person pronoun is rarely used); on the other hand, the authorship of a pathography is never in question. The case report regularly omits any reference to the physician's emotional response or intuitive insight and rarely mentions the subjectivity of the patient. Pathography, at the other extreme, tends to focus on the subjective components of a medical experience, sometimes with unavoidably theatrical results. But the drama of a pathography is no worse a distortion of reality than is the biomedical myopia of the case report. Indeed, if pathography is directly compared to the case history, the patient's own account will appear not This early picture of the way Radner oscillates between orthodox and alternative medicine during the initial stages of her illness in fact becomes a pattern, repeated again and again as the narrative and the illness progress. The notion of a patient, like "Everyman" in a medieval morality play, poised between opposing systems of health care treatment (orthodox and alternative) may seem anomalous to many physicians, but a survey of pathographical narratives will confirm this situation to be an accurate depiction of the way a surprising number of people today deal with their medical needs.
Radner's reasons for alternating between orthodox and alternative treatments are as significant as the fact that she does so. It is important that she should perceive her acupuncturist and holistic therapist, unlike her orthodox doctors, as "taking me seriously" and "paying attention to me," for this perception underlies and justifies her experimentation with alternative therapies. This course of action, too, becomes a model for the future. In every instance where she turns to alternative therapists, she does so not so much because she believes in what they are doing as because they are more attentive, more personal, more hopeful than her orthodox physicians.
Eventually her symptoms reach a point at which hospitalization becomes necessary. When tests finally reveal that she has ovarian cancer, Radner consents to an immediate hysterectomy and subsequent chemotherapy. Again she turns to alternative treatment modalities, but, this time, as complements to, rather than substitutes for, orthodox medical treatment. Significantly, it is her oncologist who suggests that she see a therapist specializing in relaxation and visualization exercises. Readers will vary as to their judgment of the wisdom of this advice. On the one hand, the oncologist, by recommending such treatment, could be seen as legitimizing experimentation with further alternative therapies, some of which might be fraudulent, some even harmful. On the other hand, given Radner's already established interest in alternative therapies, this doctor should be commended for having at least achieved the kind of rapport with his patient that allowed him to see beyond the tumor and the chemotherapy. Radner herself observes approvingly that the oncologist "understood that he was treating the mind as well as the body" [l:p. 75].
Radner does consult the therapist he recommends, and she becomes deeply involved in attempts to get well by the use of visualization and positive thinking. These attempts are reinforced when she joins a cancer support group, which instructs participants in guided imagery, visualization, and relaxation and teaches them how to "take control" of their recovery. She begins wearing healing crystals "as reminders of the body's and the spirit's desires and capacity to be well" [l:p. 174]. She makes up a chant-"I am well, I am wonderful, I am cancer-free"-which she uses as much in an attempt to drive out negative thoughts as to affirm the positive: "I'd have these words to think so that the cancer thoughts couldn't get in" end Radner is a comedienne, and the humor in this book acts as a poignant and heroic counterpart to the theme of illness and its gradual triumph. But the constant tone of hopefulness becomes ever more shrill as the book and the illness near a conclusion; indeed, Radner's experience borders on a despair paradoxically generated by her investment in cultivating a positive attitude. The result of this vicious cycle is a desperate need for hope of unrealistic proportions.
THE PHYSICIANS: WHEN THE THERAPEUTIC ALLIANCE FAILS
A second response to her story will focus on Radner's perception of the medical care she receives. Almost all Radner's orthodox doctors seem to fail her, in one way or another. Often they do so by mechanical insistence on therapeutic procedures. Thus, on one occasion, when common sense dictates that a particular treatment be discontinued because it isn't working (she miscarries during an in vitro fertilization program), she is told by her physicians that she has to continue treatments because "this was an experimental procedure and they had to follow their protocol" [l:pp. [35] [36] . Research interests here would seem to supersede a primary concern for the patient's welfare. This incident may explain in part Radner's animosity, much later, toward a doctor who, when she has a toxic reaction to chemotherapy, insists that she switch to radiation treatments. "We must complete a modality of treatment their understanding of her chances for recovery. If this is so, however, they fail in communicating with directness and compassion that the treatments they advocate are unlikely to reverse her condition. Near the end of the pathography, for example, one medical consultant advises that she use carboplatin with cytoxan, telling her, " 'There's a ten-to fifteen-percent chance that it will work to retard the cancer, and I won't say that there aren't a few cases where it has completely arrested the cancer' " [l:p. 227]. The low percentage, the word "retard" rather than "arrest," and the negative admission of a few possible successes all suggest that this is clearly an experimental treatment with a poor chance of favorable outcome. Only a desperate patient could commence such a treatment, given this kind of "recommendation." But Radner is this kind of patient, and she does commence upon this treatment. It is possible that the problems here are interactional; Radner's physicians, in urging treatments without the hope that gives them meaning, may have unwittingly reinforced her obsessive, near-pathological reliance on hope. CONCLUSIONS I began this essay by comparing pathographies like Radner's to the medical case report, observing that pathographies complement (or perhaps correct) the medical history in their emphasis on the patient, rather than the disease and its treatment. I also observed that the medical history is now undergoing criticism for its virtual omission of the patient-the suffering, feeling human being who should be at its center. Such criticisms of case histories sometimes yield practical suggestions for improvement or reform. William Donnelly, Charles Freer, and David Flood and Rhonda Soricelli all propose not dissimilar solutions to the problem. Donnelly [7] calls for a description of the patient's understanding of his or her condition to be added at the end of the chart; Freer [3] suggests that "anecdotal diagnostic summaries" be included in the problem list; Flood and Soricelli [9:p. 79] would expand the patient profile to include a narrative sense of the patient's uniqueness and suggest that the computerized history has the potential "for liberating the written history" to record more humanistic responses. Kathryn Hunter [12:p. 174] extends this argument even further, arguing that "As machines take over more of the work of diagnostic reasoning," the case history could be refocused on the important and neglected issues of the place of illness in the life of the patient. Were this change to take place, she concludes, "the diagnostic case history [could] be replaced with a therapeutic one" [12:p. 175].
Such changes and experiments in the form of the medical record are obviously both valuable and legitimate; moreover they may be instrumental in implementing a more patient-centered medicine. What I am suggesting here, though, is that medical humanists and practicing physicians alike might want to look rather carefully at a few of the many pathographies, like Radner's, now in print. For it is this genre in which patient experience is actually given an articulate voice; it is here that patient experience is recorded most fully. These narratives offer a rich source of information about patient experience, and can help us to locate specific issues in the medical enterprise that need understanding and perhaps require change. When we thus focus on the patient, we are likely to discover attitudes and behaviors of direct relevance to the management of that patient's medical condition.
In my commentary on Radner's pathography, I have tried to isolate two elements that directly affect the course of her illness-elements that would never appear in the medical history: her need for a treatment that promises a hopeful outcome, and her perception of her physicians' attitudes about her illness and their expectations as to cure. Of course, there are no easy answers to patient attitudes and expectations that prove disabling, or for the difficulties in the medical encounter indicated here. But pathographies like Radner's are useful because, in restoring both patient and doctor to the story of illness and treatment, they not only guide medicine toward a more humane enterprise-in itself a worthy goal-but also alert us to issues in the medical enterprise that powerfully affect the patient/physician relationship, treatment, and possibly the course of illness. An understanding of the kind of concerns voiced in Radner's pathography will not only make medicine more personalized and more humane; it can also make it more effective.
